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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EDWIN GOSSNER, et al, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT, a Utah 
corporation; THE STATE OF UTAH, 
by and through its Division of 
State Lands, 
Defendants-Respondents 
Case No. 16593 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS ON INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by 33 farmers against Utah Power & 
Light Company for damages to their crops, and for loss of 
farming profits during the years 1974 through 1979, the 
plaintiffs having incurred their damages by virtue of Utah 
Power & Light Company having managed the Bear River in such 
a way as to cause the river\to 
lands. 
overflow onto plaintiffs' 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This is an interlocutory appeal taken prior to trial on 
the merits, the Court having conducted a pretrial conference 
and having ruled at that conference that he would exclude 
certain evidence and apply a certain commencement date of the 
statute of limitations, the propriety of which rulings the 
parties desire to have determined prior to trial on the merits. 
1 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
This is an appeal from an Order entered by the Trial 
Court under date of July 3, 1979, the appeal being limited ~ 
three issues. The Order appealed from is attached to this 
Brief as Appendix "A". 
The three issues raised are as follows: 
(1) The Trial Court's declared intent to utilize an 
improper date of commencement of statute of 
limitations. 
(2) Error in the Court's declared intent to limit 
evidence of fault and causation in the following 
respects: 
(a) to deny introduction of testimony as to the 
effect of negligent operation of Oneida Dam, 
and 
(b) ruling that the Kimball and Dietrich Decrees 
permit a discharge of 5,500 cfs when, in fact, 
the Decrees limit the discharge of waters to 
those which can be contained in the "natural 
channel." 
( 3) The erroneous dismissal of plaintiffs Edwin Gassner 
and Josephine Go7~ner by virtue of flood easements. 
Appellants seek an Order of the Supreme Court on remand 
to the Trial Court providing the following directions to the 
Trial Court: 
(1) That the statute of limitations as to damage to 
crops commences at the time of each successive 
injury to the crops; 
(2) That plaintiffs be permitted to present testimony 
as to the causative effect of the operation of the 
Oneida Darn (and the discharges therefrom) on the 
flooding which they have experienced. 
(3) That the Court be directed that the Kimball and 
Dietrich Decrees permit discharges in the Cache 
2 
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Valley section of the Bear River by Utah Power up 
to and not exceeding the capacity of the natural 
channel, and not up to the limit of 5,500 cfs, as 
erroneously determined by the ?rial court. 
(4) That the dismissal of the claims of Edwin and 
Josephine Gossner on summary judgment be reversed, 
with directions to the Court to present the 
factual questions of: 
(a) increase of the burden of the flood easement; and 
(b) negligent abuse of the flood easement 
to the jury. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiffs consist of 33 farmers having a claim 
against Utah Power & Light Company for the flooding of their 
farms along the Bear River in the years 1974 through 1979. 
The claims are limited to damage to crops and damages 
for inability to plant crops, and do not contain any claims 
for damage to the land itself, the plaintiffs' claims 
totalling over $540,000. 
All of the farms are located downstream of the Oneida 
" Dam in Idaho and upstream ?,f 'the Cutler Dam and Reservoir 
near Logan, Utah. 
The record establishes that the flooding of the plain-
tiffs' lands is caused primarily by two factors (see Affidavit 
of Dr. James Milligan attached to this Brief as Appendix "B", 
R. 1187): 
(1) The building up of sediment in the riverbed, 
decreasing the flow-carrying capacity of the 
channel caused by the following: 
(a) the backwater effect of the Cutler Reservoir, and 
(b) the fact that the presence of both the Oneida 
and cutler Dams substantially decreases the 
3 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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normal "scouring out" of sedir.1ent buildup whic! 
would occur each spring during the flood 
season if the dams were not present. 
(2) The discharge of waters from Oneida Dam at volumes 
and time-durations which result in discharge of 
more water than the natural channel of the river 
can carry, thus causing the excess waters to flood 
out onto the farmlands. 
Plaintiffs filed the action in the fall of 1976 for 
damages to their crops, going back three years under the 
three-year statute for the years 1974, 1975 and 1976. Add~ 
tionally, they claim damages for the succeeding years of 
1977, 1978 and 1979. 
Since the filing of the Complaint, Utah Power & Light 
has modified its operation of the system to prevent most of 
the flooding, but for each of the latter three years the 
plaintiffs, in an effort to determine whether or not they 
could justify planting their lands, served interrogatories on 
Utah Power inquiring as to whether or not they could anti-
cipate flooding, which interrogatories the Power Company has 
consistently failed to answer in a manner which would justify 
the farmers planting their,,+ands. 
Accordingly, for the latter three years, some farmers 
have damages for loss of profits on crops which were actually 
planted and flooded, or grasses which were flooded, whereas 
various others did not plant for fear of losing their entire 
crops as they had in the years immediately preceding. 
ARGUMENT 
PART I: THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ISSUE 
Paragraph (3) of the Order incorrectly provides that 
the Court will rule that the statute of limitations commenced 
at the first date the plaintiffs were flooded, rather than 
4 
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adopting the proper rule which is that each time a new tres-
pass is conunitted damaging crops, the statute as to that 
damage conunences at the time of the flooding, the Order 
stating: 
"The Court holds as a matter of law that the three 
year statute of limitations (which is applicable to 
plaintiffs' claims) began to run from the date when the 
channel of the Bear River was filled with silt (caused 
by the erection of the Cutler Dam) so as to cause 
flooding of the adjacent farm land of plaintiffs." 
Utah law requires that in order to gain a prescriptive 
easement on another party's land, one must make open, 
notorious, hostile use of that land for a period of 20 con-
secutive years. 
The effect of the Trial Court's ruling is to reduce the 
period for gaining a prescriptive right to three years. 
The fact is that there has never been a period of 20 
consecutive years when the farmers were flooded. In fact, 
there has been virtually no flooding for the last three 
years (1977 through 1979). 
The Affidavit of Dr. Milligan (Appendix "B" hereto) 
states: 
. . Utah Power & Lfght could have managed the discharges 
at Oneida Dam in a manner to prevent flooding of the 
plaintiffs' farms during the crop season had it chosen 
to do so." 
The jugular vein of the issue of when the statute of 
limitations commences to run is the determination of whether 
or not the cause of the flooding is permanent and must occur 
every year that the dams stand in place, or, rather, whether 
it is what is termed in the case law as "abatable" or 
"continuous", the word "continuous" meaning in the context 
of these cases something which recurs but does not, of 
necessity, have to recur. 
5 
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No tortuous twisting of the facts can disguise the abata-
bility of the flooding in the face of the documented hist~k 
abatement. FLOODING I RESULTING FROM THE NEGLIGENT OPERATION 
OF A DAM SYSTEM, IS AN ABATABLE, AND NOT A PERMANENT, CAUSE 
OF INJURY. 
The question of when a cause of action based on injuries 
to property by flowage, diversion or obstruction of waters 
accrues where the flooding is the direct and proximate result 
of the negligent operation of the dam system and not the 
result of the naked existence of the dam has never been 
expressly decided by a court of appellate jurisdiction in 
the state of Utah. 
Numerous cases, arising in the various jurisdictions, 
make it clear that if, and when, Utah does decide this questic 
Utah will follow the clear majority in holding that flooding 
resulting from the negligent operation of the dam, as opposed 
to flooding resulting from design characteristics inherent 
in the construction of the dam, is abatable, and as such, a 
new cause of action arises with each fresh injury. 
A line of cases, decided by the Supreme Court of Kansas, 
illustrate dramatically tha.t force of logic compels the 
conclusion that injuries tc;>." property resulting from flooding 
;'' 
which could have been prevented by the defendant short of the 
destruction of his dam system are abatable, and will support 
a new cause of action for each injury. 
In HENDERSON v. TALBOTT, 266 P.2d 273 (Kans. 1954), the 
Court held that where water was impounded on the plaintiff's 
land which ebbed and flowed, depending upon the season of the 
year and the amount of rainfall, the plaintiff's injuries wer; 
temporary, not permanent, and each injury caused a new cause 
of action to accrue and the statute of limitations began to 
run anew from the date of each injury. The Court stated: 
6 
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"W~ are convince~ the rules, established by the great 
weight of authority.a~d recognized and applied by our 
bette~ reasoned decision, governing and decisive of such 
question ~s wel~ as the q~estion whether the flooding 
of land gives rise to a single right or successive rights 
of action are those succinctly set forth and stated in 
56 Am. Jur., Waters 529 § 45: 
"' ***In actions by riparian owners for damages 
for interference with the flow of a stream the 
scope of recovery is usually held to depend on 
whether the injury is permanent or continuing. The 
weight of authority is to the effect that whenever 
the structure of obstruction impeding the flow 
of water is of a permanent character, and its con-
struction and continuance are necessarily an injury, 
the damage is considered original, to be recovered 
in one action, and not continuous in character, and 
the statute of limitations begins to run from the 
completion of the obstruction, or at least from the 
time of the first injury. But when the construction 
of the structure are not necessarily injuries, but 
may or may not be so, the injury to be compensated 
in the suit is only the damage which has happened; 
and there may be as many successive recoveries as 
there are successive injuries. In such cases the 
statute of limitations begins to run from the 
happening of the injury complained of.'" (Emphasis 
supplied) 
The HENDERSON case go~s on to quote 56 Am. Jur. Waters 
858, 859, § 443 as follow~V 
"'* * *But if the overflow is merely temporary, occasional, 
or temporary, causing no permanent injury to the la~d, or 
if the situation involves other elements of uncertainty, 
such as the possibility or unlikelihood of the alteration 
or abatement of the causative conditions, or uncertainty 
in regard to the future use or improvement of the land, 
so as to prevent a reasonably accurate estima~e.of future 
damages, it is generally held that each r:petition ~f the 
overflow gives rise to a new cause of action for which 
successive actions may be brought.'" 
This is precisely the situation with which the Court 
is confronted herein. To digress from the line of Kansas 
cases briefly, if the cause of action of the plaintiffs 
7 
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accrued but one time at the construction of the dam, or in 
the alternative, at the time of the first injury, and the 
plaintiffs had gone into court and asked for damages, includi: 
damages for the injuries that are the basis of the instant 
lawsuit, how should the Court have responded to the argument 
of Utah Power that its operation of its dam system was 
abatable, and would be abated, and that, therefore, no future 
injuries were provable? 
This hypothetical situation, while purely speculative, 
shows the absurdity of Utah Power's suggestion to the Court 
that the statute of limitations commenced upon the first 
injury applied to all subsequent injuries. 
In SIMON v. NEISES, 395 P.2d 308 (Kansas 1964), the 
Kansas Court again had occasion to consider the applicabiliti 
of the statute of limitations through an action involving 
damage to land. After reiterating its subscription to the 
authorities cited in support of its opinion in HENDERSON v. 
TALBOTT, the Court went on to say: 
"* * * that where the injury or wrong is classified~ 
the courts not as original or permanent, but as 
temporary, transient, recurring, continuing or conse-
quential in nature, it has been held that the limibtim 
period starts to run .only when the plaintiffs' land or 
crops are actually harmed by overflow, and that, for th: 
purpose of the statute of limitations, each injury 
causes a new cause of action to accrue, at least until 
the injury becomes permanent." 
In GOWING v. McCANDLESS, 547 P.2d 338 (Kans. 1976) the 
Court, after reiterating the rule laid down in the two previr 
cited cases, held that the plaintiffs were seeking to recove: 
temporary damages arising from the maintenance of obstructio: 
in the watercourse on defendant's land, and limited the 
. d it 
recovery they sought to damages to their crop, sustaine w 
the statutory period prior to the filing of their petition, 
the plaintiffs' cause of action was not barred by the statut 
of limitations. The Court, in GOWING, after noting that the 
8 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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obstructions which caused the flooding were not "permanent" 
because they could be removed from the drainage ditch (as 
well as the fact that they were not "permanent" in the legal 
sense because they were not approved by the state) , found 
that the plaintiffs' cause of action was not barred by the 
statute of limitations. 
Here, again, the Kansas Court seized upon the crucial 
distinction between a permanent cause of flooding produced 
by the inherent and unmodifiable design characteristics, such 
as lawfully placed darns and bridges, as opposed to temporary 
causes such as the buildup of silt or the negligent operation 
of what would otherwise be a permanent improvement. 
The line of Kansas cases referred to herein is concluded 
by CLAWSON v. GARRISON, 592 P.2d 117 (Kans. 1979). The 
holding in CLAWSON makes clear the underlying basis of the 
adoption of the rule set out in the previously cited cases. 
The CLAWSON Court states: 
"Flooding is an infrequent and virtually unpredictable 
occurrence. The amount of both present and future 
damages to defendant could not reasonably be determined 
in a single action." 
(The flooding being refer.r~d. to was produced by an upper 
landowner's leveling of lar\d reducing its capability to 
retain surface water.) 
Other states have announced rules for determining the 
accrual of a cause of action which are substantially the same 
as that followed by the Kansas Court. The Supreme Court of 
Idaho in WOODLAND v. LYON, 298 P.2d 380 (1956), was called upon 
to determine whether a continuing diversion of water from 
a watercourse to the injury of the downstream landowner was 
a single wrong or a continuing one. The Idaho Court stated: 
"The tort herein alleged is not a single wrong, but 
a continuing one, and appellant may, if the evidence 
supports his claim, recover for all injuries occurring 
9 
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within the statutory period, even though the obstruction 
occurred more than four years before the complaint 
was filed." 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in CITY OF COLLINSVILLE 
v. SWISHER, 162 P.2d 324 (1945), decided a case which is 
particularly analogous to the case before the Court. In that 
case, the city had constructed a pipeline at such levels that 
when the water rose to a certain point in the river it was 
forced through the pipeline into the reservoir. Somewhere 
along the line a manhole was constructed to acconunodate a 
cutoff valve, which the city neglected to keep closed, and 
through this valve and manhole water ran out upon plaintiff's 
land overflowing, and some of the water remained on the land 
until the water in the river lowered to where the water stanc. 
on the plaintiff's land could recede back through the pipe 
into the river. 
The evidence showed that the land would not have over-
flowed but for the pipeline and the negligent maintenance ani 
operation of the cutoff valve through which the water flowed 
upon plaintiff's land. The Court stated: 
"Under the foregoing authorities the limitation is set 
in motion to the action for damages for such injuries a' 
were the natural and; qbvious result of the erection of 
the permanent improve~ents at the time of the cornpletic: 
thereof, but this rule does not apply to such other 
injuries as subsequently resulted from the negligent 
maintenance or operation of the improvements, and the 
limitation as to the latter is set in motion at the 
time such injuries occur." 
That is precisely the situation with which the Court is 
herein confronted. The plaintiffs do not claim that the 
erection of the dam in and of itself caused them harm. 
The existence of the dam, the only "permanent" aspect of thi 
setting of this case, is not alleged by the plaintiffs to 
necessarily cause injury. It is, rather, the operation of 
the system by Utah Power that is causing the injury. Al tho 
the erection of Cutler Dam is permanent and does cause t~ 
10 
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sediment buildup in the river channel due to the backwater 
effect, Utah Power has the option of either dredging the channel 
or decreasing its flow of water from Oneida. All irrigation 
districts have to clean their canals from time to 
time, and we know of no special law which gives Utah Power 
license to clog up its channel and then proceed to use the 
farmers' lands as a substitute for that channel. This dis-
tinction is obvious. It is the same distinction pointed up 
by the popular bumper sticker that reads "Guns don't kill 
people, people kill people." 
Finally, the Court, in NELSON, et al, v. ROBINSON, et al, 
118 P.2d 350 (Cal. 1941), states the general rule governing 
actions of this character: 
"The courts of this state have repeatedly held that one 
who permits water to percolate from his artificial canal 
to the property of his adjoining neighbor commits an 
invasion of the latter's rights for which redress is 
obtainable in damages, by injunction or through the 
abatement of a nuisance." (Emphasis supplied) 
While the Court is confronted with flooding produced by 
the negligent operation of a darn system, as opposed to per-
colating waters resulting f~om an artificial canal, the 
principle is the same. ;\I 
The court, in NELSON, makes a statement which is not only 
incisive but illustrates the folly of Utah Power's assertion 
that only one cause of action has accrued in this case, which 
cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. The 
Court states: 
"No one should be permitted to acquire a prescriptive 
right to continue a negligent act. We therefore hold 
that appellants are entitled to reco~er.for any injury 
to their lands which was inflicted within three years 
prior to the commencement of the action." 
Clearly, the court would reach an anomalous result if it 
were to hold, as Utah Power has requested, that a single 
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cause of action accrued many years ago which is not blocked 
by the statute of limitations. If it were to so hold, the 
Court would have decided that in three years Utah Power coulc 
gain a prescriptive right to continue its negligent acts, 
whereas Utah law requires twenty years to gain a prescriptive 
easement. 
In its briefing in the Trial Court, Utah Power misled 
the Court citing HAYES v. ST. LOUIS AND SAN FRANCISCO 
RAILROAD co., 162 SW 266 (Mo. 1914), for the proposition 
that where a dam is completely built and therefore permanent, 
the statute of limitations commences when the dam first 
causes flooding. Anticipating that that case may be relied 
upon again by Utah Power, we invite the Court's attention to 
the fact that the Court, in HAYES, defined the determining 
factor to be whether or not the injury is necessarily a 
permanent injury as opposed to the other type of injury 
which is variously termed by the Courts to be continuous or 
abatable. The rule of law applicable to the instant case is 
stated twice at page 268 of the Southwestern Reporter: 
" . . but where the nuisance is of a continuing (abat-
able) nature, each continuance gives rise to a new caus: 
of action, and successive actions may be maintained 
for the damages accruing from time to time. 
''\! 
.Nuisances consisting of acts done, or particular 
uses of property, may be properly termed 'continuing' 
when they are such a character that they may continue 
indefinitely, or, on the other hand, may be discon-
tinued at any time." (Emphasis supplied) 
The fact that Utah Power was able to stop the flooding 
during the last three years is, at least, prima facie evider.: 
that the injury is abatable and subject to discontinuation 
rather than permanent. 
The Court, in HAYES, quotes with approval from CARSON v. 
CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, 53 Mo. App. 289, the following language 
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.. When the n~isance or cause of the injury may be 
~emoved or remedied at any time, the measure of damages 
~s t~e a~tual damage sustained up to the date of the 
institution of the suit. Damages accruing subsequently 
must be recovered in successive actions." 
That, of course, is the situation here. The historical abate-
ment illustrates this. 
PART II. UTAH POWER IS ESTOPPED TO ASSERT THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS 
Should the Supreme Court disagree with the position of the 
farmers on the date of commencement of the statute of limita-
tions, then, in that event, the remand should direct the Trial 
Court to permit the presentation of testimony to the jury on 
the issue that the Utah Power & Light Company is estopped to 
assert the statute of limitations defense. 
The reply of the plaintiffs to the Answer and Counterclaim 
of Utah Power contains a Motion to Strike the Fourth Affirmative 
Defense of Utah Power, as set forth in an Amendment to the 
Reply reading as follows (R. 1183): 
"COME NOW the plaintiffs and move the court for an order 
amending their Reply to the Answer of Utah Power and 
Light by adding a Motion to Strike as follows: 
"'To strike the P~mrth Affirmative Defense to the 
effect that the claim of plaintiffs is barred by 
the statute of i'imitations upon the ground that 
Utah Power is estopped to assert said defense by 
virtue of having in numerous meetings with 
plaintiffs: 
"'(a) 
U I (b) 
denied that its facilities caused the 
flooding; and 
provided plaintiffs with engineering 
studies over the years allegedly 
demonstrating Utah Power's non-
responsibili ty. '" 
The depositions of the various plaintiffs establish that 
they had numerous meetings with Utah Power officials since 
1948, in which Utah Power denied that its facilities or its 
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mode of operation of the facilities was causing the flooding 
Certainly, in face of those affirmative representations to 
the plaintiffs by Utah Power which were given for the pur~~ 
of forestalling lawsuits (and did have that effect), Utah 
Power is estopped from now raising the statute of limitations. 
This, of course, is a factual matter which must be determinea 
upon the evidence at trial, and we simply ask that the remand 
require that the Trial Court allow evidence to be presented c 
this issue. 
There is a further aspect to the statute of limitations 
question, and that is the fact that most jurisdictions provic 
that a statute of limitations does not commence to run until 
a person knew, or should have known, of the cause of his 
injury. In the instant case Utah Power is denying that its 
facilities and its operation of its facilities are the C9H 
of any flooding on plaintiffs' lands, and since Utah Power 
makes such denial, certainly it is estopped from asserting 
that plaintiffs "knew, or should have known," of Utah 
Power's culpability at some earlier date. 
The fact is that the plaintiffs procured a preliminary 
engineering study in 197~ <\nd filed suit that same year, and 
it was not until final en~1~neering work was completed 
by Dr. Milligan in preparation for trial in 1979, that t~ 
plaintiffs actually had solid proof that Utah Power is 
responsible for the flooding. 
PART III. THE TRIAL COURT ORDER ERRS IN RULING THAT THE 
KIMBALL AND DIETRICH DECREES ESTABLISH NO LIA-
BILITY OF UTAH POWER AND LIGHT WHERE THE DISCHARG: 
FROM ONEIDA DAM DOES NOT EXCEED 5,500 CFS. 
The Order reads, in part, as follows under Section (21 
thereof (Appendix "A" hereto): 
"The Court further rules as a matter of law that with 
regard to the release of waters the standard of ca:e 1 imposed upon the defendant is established by the K1mba 
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and Dietrich decrees, and inasmuch as it is stipulated 
that such releases have never exceeded 5 500 cf th 
· 1 · b · 1 · , s, ere l~ n~ .ia l i~y of the defendant either in absolute 11ab1l1t~ or in negligence because of release of water 
from Oneida Dam." 
We have appended the pertinent parts of the Idaho Deitrich 
Decree to this Brief as Appendix "C", and the pertinent parts 
of the Kimball Decree as Appendix "D". 
The Dietrich Decree is from a federal district court 
case in Idaho, wherein Utah Power & Light was granted the 
authority to collect and impound the waters during flood 
season at Stewart Dam near Bear Lake up to a maximum water 
right of 5,500 cfs. 
At no point in the Dietrich Decree did the Court give 
the right to discharge waters at that level in the Cache 
Valley, the Dietrich Decree stating at page 8: 
••. and the waters released by it from storage may 
be conveyed through the NATURAL CHANNEL of the 
river ... 
(Note the Decree states "natural channel" not entire flood 
plain.) 
The Kimball Decree incorporated the Idaho Dietrich Decree 
\ 
by reference, and then, with respect to the right of Utah 
.. 
Power to discharge waters, the Decree stated at page 6: 
"After passing said state line such released stored 
waters may be conveyed through that part of the 
natural channel of said river covered by this Decree. 
There is in this record an Affidavit of plaintiffs' 
engineer, Dr. James Milligan, (App. "B" hereto) stating 
specifically: 
. . • (1) The natural channel of the Bear River at 
various points between Oneida Dam and Cutler Reservoir, 
and in particular the areas at or near the farms o~ 
the plaintiffs, will over~low its banks whe~ the river 
contains a flow of approximately 3,400 cfs. 
15 
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Thus, the Trial Court is clearly in error in its use of the 
5,500 cfs figure, and unless the Supreme Court corrects that 
error on this interlocutory appeal the plaintiffs will not 
even have an opportunity to present this liability issue __ 
at best, the question is a factual question and not a matter 
of law. 
The evidence through the depositions establishes that 
the right to collect 5,500 cfs up in Idaho at the Stewart 
Dam is a collection of waters at flood stage. Historically 
there have never been discharges during the crop season, 
and certainly not in July, August and September, of flows 
of 5,500 cfs in the Cache Valley. 
It should further be noted that both the Kimball and 
Dietrich actions were actions for determinations of water 
rights and were not actions to condemn land for flood ease-
ments. Both Decrees granted Utah Power and Light the right 
to collect 5,500 cfs above Bea= Lake and store that water in 
Bear Lake, and both Decrees provided that the discharge of 
that water would be through the natural channel and not over 
the whole flood plain, including the farms of all of the 
farmers from Bear Lake to Salt Lake. It is important that 
this error be corrected ori' 1the remand so that proper evidenc~ 
can be presented to the jury, particularly on the issue that 
the discharges at Oneida under the control of Utah Power 
during the years of the flooding have been due to their 
negligent operation of the Oneida discharge levels in 
derogation of the rights of the plaintiff farmers. 
PART IV. THE IMPROPER DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINTS OF PLAIN!; 
EDWIN AND JOSEPHINE GOSSNER BY VIRTUE OF AN EARLY 
FLOOD EASEMENT. 
The Trial Court Order of July 3, 1979 rules as follows·, 
respect to the Summary Judgment against Edwin and Josephine 
Gassner: 
16 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
· It ~s ~ur~her ordered that the Motion for Summary Jud~me~t d1sm1~s1ng with prejudice the complaint of the 
plaintiffs Edwin Gossner and Josephine Gossner 
0 
th 
ground that they and their predecessors have h~re~ofo~e 
conveyed fl~od easements to Utah Power and Light be 
and hereby is granted." 
The issue whether or not an easement has been negligently 
abused or whether the burden on the easement has been wrongfully 
increased is a jury question. 
Utah Power has filed as a "Third Claim for Relief" 
commencing at page 4 of its Amended Answer and Counterclaim, a 
defense as to the plaintiff, Ed Gassner, that the power company 
holds a flood easement on his land and that, therefore, his 
claim is not proper and that, additionally, he is liable for 
attorney's fees and court costs for participating in this 
action. 
The fact is that the Gassner Flood Easement was executed 
on the then existing type of operation of the river in 1953, 
and that operation has changed materially in recent years so 
that it is flooding more of Mr. Gossner's land at different 
and more inconvenient times than existed at the time the 
easement was taken. The law is, as established by a Ninth 
Circuit Court case involv~n'g Utah Power & Light, that such 
a flood easement is not a 'defense. 
In GRIFFITH v. UTAH POWER & LIGHT CO. (1955), 226 F.2d 
661, the Ninth Circuit Court held that even where the power 
company has a perpetual easement, still it may be held 
liable for damages caused by its wrongful or negligent 
flooding of the plaintiff. 
In GRIFFITH, the Ninth Circuit Court overruled a dis-
missal granted by the District Judge on summary judgment, 
premised on the existence of the easements, the Court 
stating at page 668: 
"Even if defendant had an absolute right, under the 
principle that one must not use even vested pr~p~rty 
in such a manner wrongfully or negligently to lnJure 
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another, there was a cause of action stated. This 
unquestionably made a genuine issue of material fact 
upon which plaintiffs were entitled to a jury. No 
matter how convenient it may have been for defendant a 
the trial court to have disposed of the whole case by r 
finding the fact established by the uncontroverted 
affidavits of defendant, the ruling would have been 
error. 
"The trial court was vested with no discretion. The 
Federal Constitution gives a right of jury trial in a 
contested issue in a law action. This right is positive 
and should not be whittled away by decision of contestec 
issues by the judge at hearings in camera before tri~. 
The summary judgment rule does not confer this power 
even in a nonjury case. The remedy can be invoked 
only when complete absence of genuine fact issue appears 
on the face of the record. Resort to summary j udgrnent 
procedure is futile where there is any doubt as to 
whether there is a fact issue. All doubts upon the 
point must be resolved against the moving party. This 
Rule, on account of these limitations, was not intended 
to be used as a substitute for a regular trial of cases 
where rthere are disputed issues of fact upon which the 
outcome of the litigation depends.' This procedure 
is not, and of right ought not to be, a substitute for 
a trial by jury or judge. Plaintiffs had set up a 
claim of the negligence of defendant in respect to the 
release of water through their land. The defendant 
controverted the negligence. Even if the trial court 
believed there was no ,chance of recovery, he was bound 
to try out the issue. thus contested. This is true even 
though the court may';'have believed some one issue was 
decisive." 
In other words, the GRIFFITH case stands for the propo· 
sition that even if the power company has a right to flood 
lands under certain conditions, it can be held accountable i 
negligence if it unnecessarily and negligently does so. 
The Court further held in GRIFFITH that a perpetual 
easement granted to a power and light company for flooding c 
lands in the operation of dams must be construed in the ligt 
of conditions prevailing at the time of its making, the 
Court stating at page 667: 
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" ...• The part~es, furthermore, must have construed 
th~ ~nstrument i~ th~ light of the conditions pre-
vailing at the time it was made." (Citing Hogan v. 
Blakney, 73 Idaho 274, 251 P.2d 209) 
JOHNSON v. TWIN FALLS CANAL co. (1946), 66 Idaho 660, 
167 P.2d 834, holds that a grant of right to flood land does 
not carry with it the right to erode and destroy the land. 
In the JOHNSON case the water level contemplated at the time 
that the easements were acquired was a level of about eight 
feet, and the Court held the easements did not give the canal 
company the right to increase the water level to eleven feet 
and thus cause erosion to plaintiff's land. 
Thus, under the rule of the GRIFFITH case and the JOHNSON 
case, it is a jury question as to whether the power company 
has improperly and negligently abused what easements it 
might have and as to whether, in light of the conditions 
prevailing at the time the easements were given, the company 
is liable for its actions. 
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the 
1975 case brought by the Idaho farmers against Utah Power 
for flooding near Montpelier along the Bear River also 
contained two plaintiffs"wti'o had given flood easements to 
Utah Power. WAYNE KUNZ, ~if al, v. UTAH POWER & LIGHT, S26 
F.2d 500. 
Again, the KUNZ case is attached in full as Appendix "E" 
to this Brief, but we quote for the Court's convenience here 
the portion of the opinion at pages 504 and SOS, 526 Fed. 
Rep., under headnote [10), the Federal Reporter reading as 
follows: 
"[10) Utah Power held flood easements on the property 
of two of the landowners. The trial court as~ed the 
jury for separate verdicts for these two but instructed 
it that despite the easements Utah Power 'was not . 
entitled to negligently flood those lands unnecessarily 
or to cause damage to those lands which reasonably could 
have been prevented.' Instruction 20. Utah Power 
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contends that this charge was erroneous and that it 
should be exempt from liability for flood damage to 
land on which it held flood easements. we find this 
instru~tion.to be consistent with the holding of this 
Court in Griffeth v. Utah Power & Light Co., 226 F.2d 
661, 668-69 (9th Cir. 1955), which held the same defend· 
ant potentially liable for negligence in causing flood 
damage despite the existence of a flood easement. 11 
The deposition of Ed Gossner in this case establishes 
that at the time he gave the flood easement, the Utah Power 
& Light representatives advised him that there would be no 
more flooding to be expected on his lands than he had been 
experiencing in previous years. 
The representative further told him that he could contir 
to use his lands for farming purposes as he had in the past. 
Mr. Gossner' s deposition further establishes that up unt 
about 1960 he was making excellent use of his bottomlands, in 
fact, getting two crops a year off of them by planting rye 
in the fall which would be harvested in the spring for silag1 
and then planting on the same ground a corn crop which would 
be harvested later in the fall for silage -- in fact, it was 
his most valuable ground. 
His deposition further establishes that commencing about 
" 1960 the power company bei<tn to flood his lands to a greater 
and greater extent where, until finally in the 1970' s, he wa' 
unable to rely on planting any of it. 
It is a jury question (and certainly not a matter of la· 
to be determined before the evidence is in) as to whether u, 
increased flooding on Gossner' s land is due to negligence of 
Utah Power. 
It is further a jury question as to whether Utah Power 
has increased the burden of the flooding beyond that which 
was contemplated by the parties when the easement was granti 
The deposition of Mr. Gossner sets up those disputed facts, 
and Mr. Gossner is entitled to have that question determine; 
by the jury, with the granting of summary judgment being 
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improper where the record contains a dispute of substantial 
material facts. 
We therefore request that the remand provide that the 
action of the Court in granting the summary judgment dis-
missing Mr. Gossner's complaint be overruled, and that the 
Court be directed to present the issues to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
, 
It is respectfully submitted that the Order of the Trial 
Court as to the issues presented on this appeal be reversed, 
and that the remand provide: 
(1) That the statute of limitations as to damage to 
crops commences at the time of each successive 
injury to the crops; 
(2) That plaintiffs be permitted to present testimony 
as to the causative effect of the operation of the 
Oneida Dam (and the discharges therefrom) on the 
flooding which they have experienced. 
(3) That the Court be directed that the Kimball and 
Dietrich Decrees permit discharges in the Cache 
Valley section o~. the Bear River by Utah Power up 
to and not exc~eding the capacity of the natural 
•" 
channel, and not up to the limit of 5,500 cfs, as 
erroneously determined by the Trial Court. 
(4) That the dismissal of the .claims of Edwin and 
Josephine Gassner on summary judgment be reversed, 
with directions to the Court to present the 
factual questions of: 
(a) increase of the burden of the flood easement; and 
(bl negligent abuse of the flood easement 
to the jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RACINE, HUNTLEY & OLSON 
By·~~-,---:--:::--;-;~;:-,-::-;:---:r::-::--~ Robert C. Huntley, Jr. 
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HILLYARD, GUNNELL & LOW 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two copies of the foregoing Brief 
were mailed to Albert J. Colton, 800 Continental Bank Buildi
1 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and to Richard L. Dewsnup, 301 
Empire /tlding, 231 E. 4th South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 841 
this day of September, 1979, in envelopes with sufficie 
postage prepaid thereon. 
\ 
\ 
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